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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
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With the rapid evolution of the global defense management environment, an innovative 
strategy to reinforce the international competitiveness of the National Defense Industry (NDI) 
through competitiveness analysis is required. Thus, it is necessary to develop appropriate 
models for analyzing the Korean NDI and to conduct competitiveness analysis by using the 
developed model. 
For the purpose of analyzing the international competitiveness of the Korean NDI, the 
researcher reviews the characteristics and problems for various existing models and the 
competitiveness analysis results for other civil industries. He then compares the attributes of the 
NDI with civil industries and analyzes the critical technology competitiveness of the NDI for 
major nations. In addition, he examines the defense policies under the worldwide reform of the 
defense management environment and the global change of the international defense market. 
The researcher develops the Pentagon-Defense 8 Factors (P-D8F) model, a proposed 
optimum analysis model for the NDI, by applying the results of the analysis for various existing 
models while considering the unique characteristics of the NDI. He then analyzes the 
international competitiveness of the Korean NDI by using the P-D8F model, and derives the 
reinforcement strategy to enhance the global competitiveness for the Korean NDI. Finally, he 
suggests a possible defense acquisition policy to promote the desired technological innovation 
and to improve the management environment effectively. 
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Introduction 
Since the cessation of the Cold War, most nations have focused their energies on 
enhancing their economic and technological powers instead of on reinforcing their military 
power. In particular, the powerful military nations—such as the US, France and Russia—
steadily carry out various projects, transforming military companies into civil companies. They 
have also effectively accomplished the military transformation based on the Effect-based 
Operation (EBO) to transform the defense industrial base (DoD, 2003).  
With the rapid transition of the global defense management environment, along with the 
reinforcement of the WTO system and the increase of global competition, the NDI can't be 
maintained by the long-sustained government control and support anymore. Many defense 
companies try to make a good profit and survive in the global environment. For the past 40 
years, the government in Korea has played a leading role in producing and supplying military 
materiel. The NDI has been promoted strongly by government initiatives, but the most advanced 
military materiel hasn't been researched or developed with domestic technology, capabilities 
and resources. The critical military technologies haven't been acquired yet, and the international 
competitiveness of the Korean NDI is very low in comparison with that of developed countries. 
Therefore, Korean companies don't have the capabilities to research and develop the most 
advanced weapons to be competitive internationally (Lee, 2007). 
For these reasons, a great deal of extensive research must be conducted in an effort to 
discover the proper strategy to strengthen the international competitiveness of the NDI. 
However, due to the lack of a competitiveness analysis model, there haven't been any 
considerable efforts to research or to develop the systematic improvement methodologies to 
solve the above-mentioned problems. To overcome these problems effectively, an original 
analysis model, which fully takes into account the defense characteristics based on the civil 
industries model, is required. Thus, the researcher has developed an innovative analytic 
strategy for promoting the international competitiveness of the NDI. 
The purposes of this study are as follows. The first purpose is to develop and validate 
the optimum analysis model for the Korean NDI, based on the analytic results for various 
existing models and the consideration of the NDI’s unique characteristics. The second purpose 
is to analyze and review the international competitiveness of the Korean NDI and to compare it 
with the competitiveness of the NDIs in other major nations by applying the proposed model. 
The final objective is to suggest the reinforcement strategy that may enhance the global 
competitiveness of the Korean NDI. 
Development of International Competitiveness Analysis Model for 
the Korean National Defense Industry 
1. Characteristics of the Korean National Defense Industry 
The Korean NDI has several different characteristics than do other civil industries or the 
NDIs of developed countries. First, the NDI is a government-dependant industry contributing to 
national security and showing monopolistic and oligopolistic characteristics under government 
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control and support. Second, the NDI is an industry that contributes and enhances the national 
military power and fosters the national economy. Therefore, its economical efficiency isn’t 
considered, and one-sided investment is mandated by government policy. As a result of this 
policy, high national economic growth is unintentionally achieved in the confined fields of the 
shipbuilding, aviation, and automobile industries. Third, the military authorities require the 
military materiel with the best quality rather than at the lowest cost. And the government controls 
the demand and supply within the scope of the defense budget and the quantity of each 
service’s request. The law of supply and demand does not work in the NDI. There is always a 
balance of supply and demand in the market. Finally, excessive plant investment and the long-
term diversion of capital from the defense industry are required. Thus, the operating rate is very 
low, and the quantity is unstable and limited depending upon the government policy and the 
surrounding environment. It's hard to estimate demand for just 5-plus years. 
2. Korean Acquisition Process of Defense Materiel 
In 2006, the restructuring of the entire acquisition system in Korea was completed. One 
of the goals of this was to redirect the government acquisition policy to Defense Reform 2020 
(MND, 2005), stressing self-reliant defense based on the Korea-US alliance. Other goals were 
to pursue the transformation for Technological Forces and to effectively increase the investment 
in the defense R&D (research and development) budget (6.5% average). The guidelines for this 
key acquisition reform were to: require transparency, increase efficiency, secure expertise and 
professionals, enhance competitiveness, and strengthen international cooperation. 
Acquisition flow has been reorganized, as shown in Figure 1. Formerly, requirement and 
procurement were driven by the services (JCS, Army, Navy, and Air Force). The acquisition 
organizations such as MND (Ministry of national Defense), DPA (Defense Procurement 
Agency), PMOs (Army-Navy-Air Force Project Management Office), T&EO (Test and Evaluation 
Office), DQAA (Defense Quality Assurance Agency), and ADD (Agency for Defense 
Development) weren’t well connected organically. The PPBEES (planning, programming, 
budgeting, execution, and evaluation system) did not work continuously and systematically 
during the lifecycle of materiel acquisition. The ADD, along with other organizations, used to be 
at the center of acquisition. Presently, requirements come from services. But the DAPA 
(Defense Acquisition Program Administration)—into which 8 organizations related to defense 
acquisition have merged—is now at the center of acquisition, while the ADD has remained at 
the center of R&D activities.  
Figure 2 shows the acquisition process—including the system development flow, which 
is somewhat similar to that in the US. Requirements come from the services and the MND. After 
preliminary studies, the DAPA decides the mode of development. Figure 2 also shows the flow 
of system development from S&T to deployment. Preliminary studies are dedicated to concept 
development, alternative analysis and interoperability analysis to establish acquisition trade-offs. 
The exploratory development phase is composed of concept exploration and technology 
development stages; engineering efforts are dedicated to authorizing the operational concepts 
and required capabilities and to eliminating technical risks before a program enters the system 
development phase. The system development phase is composed of system integration and 
system demonstration stages. Constructive and virtual simulation models are utilized for design 
and system verification. System and subsystem performance analysis tools are used for 
verifying that designs are compliant with the requirements (DAPA, 2007). 
The DAPA organization is shown in Figure 3. The Commissioner (at the Vice Minister 
level) is the head of DAPA. At the next lower level, the Vice Commissioner oversees Acquisition 
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Planning, Defense Industry Promotion, Analysis/T&E, and Policy & Public Relation Management 
Bureaus. There is also the Program Management Agency, which controls several programs with 
the help of IPTs.  
 
Figure 1. Key Thrusts for Acquisition Reform (Reorganization) 
 








Figure 3. Organization of Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) 
3. International Competitiveness Analysis Model for the Korean National Defense 
Industry 
The existing civil competitiveness models (Porter, 1998) are insufficient for analyzing the 
Korean NDI because of its different characteristics. The rule of market economy doesn't work, 
as the operations of most firms are under the government’s control. In the NDI, the economy 
system is governed rather by the government-initiated economy than the private-initiated 
economy. The sole consumer is the government, and the NDI’s supply and the government’s 
demand always meet in the market. Government programs, instead of the mechanisms of 
market economy, decide demand. 
As for Korea, all competitiveness factors in the NDI are dictated by the government's 
intention and policy. The foreign policy and international relations of the major powerful nations, 
such as the US, China, and other surrounding nations, are also important factors with which to 
analyze the competitiveness of the NDI. And chance is important because it creates 
discontinuities and plays its role partly by altering conditions in the competitiveness models. 
These characteristics must be considered as the optimized models are built (Lee, 2000). 
By applying the analysis results for various existing models and considering the unique 
characteristics of the Korean NDI, the researcher was able to develop the optimum analysis 
model for the Korean NDI. In case of the Korean NDI, 5 determinants to achieve the national 
competitive advantages among the nations exist: factor conditions, the strategy and rivalry 
among the firms, related and supporting industries, demand conditions, and the government 
defense policy. And 3 influencers of true competitiveness are: the industrial cluster, the defense 
policy and the relations of foreign nations, and chance. 
Figure 4 shows the Pentagon-Defense 8 Factors Model (P-D8F)—with 5 determinants 
and 3 influencers for competitiveness of the Korean NDI. The factors of the national competitive 
advantage according to determinants and influencers are shown in Table 1. 
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Figure 4. The Pentagon-Defense 8 Factors Model for the Korean NDI 
Table 1. Determinants and Influencers of Pentagon-Defense 8 Factors Model for the 
Korean NDI 
Determinants and 
Influencers Factors for National Competitiveness Advantage 
Factor 
Conditions 
· Human, physical, knowledge, and capital resources 
· Infrastructure 
· Mechanisms creating competitive advantage 
Demand 
Conditions 
· Demand size and pattern of growth 
· Internationalization of domestic demand 




· Presence of internationally competitive supplier 
and related industry 
· Competitive advantage of supplier and related industry 
Firms Strategy 
and Rivalry 
· Management strategy and structure of domestic firms 
· Vision, goals, and leadership  






· Policies toward defense acquisition and capital market 
· Product standard and regulation 





· Presence of industrial park and complex, high-technology park, 
and evolutional process of cluster 
· Existence of cluster for several industries 
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· Political decision by foreign government 
· Variations of international defense environment 
 and military expenditure 
· Regulations of arms export and technology transfer 
Chance 
· Invention, technology innovation, and oil shock 
· Significant shift in world financial market 
· International dispute and regional war 
 
International Competitiveness Analysis of the Korean National 
Defense Industry Using the Pentagon-Defense 8 Factors Model 
1. Factor Conditions 
In 2007, the Korean NDI was composed of 88 companies producing diverse systems 
and components of 10 fields of defense materiel. Yet, they show very low operating rates of 
50% to 60%, low profit margins of 8.1%, and very low revenue per capita of $240 million (KDIA, 
2007). All data hardly come up to those of Korean civil industries and foreign countries. The 
international competitiveness of the Korean NDI in the world market is very weak. The 
continuous-growth strategy must be propelled by defense reform and self-reliant cooperation.  
Table 2. Variations of Operating Rate for the Korean NDI 
Year 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Operating Rate 
(%) 58.2 59.8 56.1 55.7 57.4 54.5 57.3 56.1 57.8 60.6 
 
Table 3. Productivity & Technology Capability for the Korean NDI in 2005 







Figures 8.1 240 57.8 67 
Remarks 
(civil industries)  12.2 500 79.8 80 
 
Table 4 shows the variations of full-time employees of the Korean NDI. Since 2000, the 
number of total employees of the NDI has been decreasing gradually due to factory automation 
and reduction in demand for conventional weapons. Furthermore, expert research engineers 
are no more than 2,000, 10% of full-time NDI employees. In addition, the number of Korean 
defense R&D employees in the government—including the associated Institutes and Agency—
is just 4,000, quite small compared to 200,000 of the US, 25,000 of Germany, and 18,000 of 
Taiwan. Lacking expert manpower, the technical level of the NDI can’t improve and is still far 
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Table 4. Variations of Full-time Employees for the Korean NDI 
Year 1988 1991 1996 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Number 23,418 27,794 29,640 23,179 23,184 23,007 22,226 20,912 
 
According to the US Military Critical Technologies List (MTCL), which shows country-by-
country estimates of the general status of technological capabilities, Korea doesn't retain the 
critical technologies of Aeronautics Systems, Energy Systems, Sensor and Laser, and Space 
Systems. One the other hand, Korea’s technology levels of Information Systems, Materials, and 
Nuclear Systems come more or less close to those of the developed countries (DoD, 2004). In 
this regard, the Korean government tries to enhance its defense technology competitiveness 
through technology interactions (spin-off and spin-on) with commercial sectors, and lay-out 
schemes fostering the high technology areas strategically. 
The defense R&D budget is about $1,060 million. That was 4.7% of the defense budget 
of $22,513 million and 14.1% of the defense materiel improvement budget of $7,499 million in 
2006 (MND, 2007). It is gradually increasing every year, but the defense R&D budget in 2005 
($740 million) was quite small compared to major nations—$82,250 million in the US, $4,690 
million in the UK, and $4,850 million in France (SIPRI, 2006). The Defense budget in 2006 
national GDP is still low; just 2.6% compared with the US, 3.7%, China, 3.9%, and Russia, 4.9% 
(Hackett, 2007). The defense budget versus the GDP and the defense R&D budget versus thte 
defense budget have to be increased gradually up to developed countries’ levels. 
 
Table 5. Variations of Defense Budget and Defense R&D Budget 
Year 1990 1992 1996 1998 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Defense 
Budget ($M) 6,608 8,309 12,243 13,800 16,364 17,515 18,941 20,823 22,513
Defense R&D 
Budget ($M) 143 235 374 479 723 739 797 929 1,060
Rate (%) 2.1 2.8 3.1 3.5 4.4 4.2 4.2 4.5 4.7 
 
Table 6. Defense R&D Budget for Major Nations (2005)                                                            
(at constant 2003 prices) 
Country US UK France Italy Japan Russia Korea 
Defense Budget 
($100M) 4,782 483 462 272 421 210 162 
Defense R&D 
Budget ($100M) 822.5 46.9 48.5 6.8 15.2 23.7 7.4 
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2. Demand Conditions 
Demand is decided within the scope of requirements of the services and the defense 
budget. It is difficult for the NDI to estimate the demand for even 5 years. The materiel 
improvement programs of the Armed Forces are established by the MND and the DAPA through 
a 5-year, mid-term plan. However, the procurement budget is finally set with the adjustment and 
deliberation of the government (Ministry of Strategy and Finance) and the National Assembly 
annually. Therefore, it quite restricts the NDI from establishing a mid- and long-term 
management plan. 
Recently, Korean domestic demand for defense materiel has been limited because 
services want the cutting-edge weapon systems, yet the NDI lacks critical technologies. Industry 
promotion is restricted due to the insufficient domestic demand, and the creation of a new 
market is ineffective. The core technology level compared to that in leading countries is 67% in 
2004; most areas of cutting-edge technology are even more vulnerable. 
Table 7 shows the variations of gross sales of the Korean NDI. Total sales in 2006 
reached $5,452 million—45 times greater than the total sales in 1988, $120 million. But, the 
growth rate of total sales (2.5%) is very low compared with the 6.3% of civil industries in 2006. 
The operating income increases to $267 million—4 times greater than the $61 million in 1988. 
On the other hand, the operating profit margin of 4.9% reaches 5.3% of civil industries, while the 
ordinary profit margin of 3.0% is lower than 5.7% of civil industries. 
Table 7. Variations of Gross Sales for the Korean NDI 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total Sales ($M) 3,705 4,366 4,269 4,644 5,317 5,452 
Growth Rate (%) 11.1 17.8 -2.3 8.8 14.5 2.5 
Operating Income ($M) 221 151 154 141 250 267 
Ordinary Income ($M) -115 25 56 86 149 163 
 
The export of defense materiel by the NDI alone is difficult. To make it possible, the 
cooperation of the government, military, and the NDI is required. As for the exports of defense 
materiel, the training and education programs and logistics are transferred to the purchasing 
country. The establishment of the export marketing strategy by the NDI is restricted because 
customers are foreign governments. 
The number of major conventional weapons being exported and imported is decreasing 
steadily, whereas the demand for advanced materiel systems is increasing gradually. In 2006, 
Korea’s arms imports amounted to about $600 million (the 9th largest in the world market), while 
Korean arms exports were numbered at about $255 (the 20th largest, taking just 0.2% in the 
world market) (KDIA, 2007). In the period 2001 through 2005, Korean arms exports ranked the 
17th largest ($337 million), and arms import ranked the 9th largest ($2,561 million) (SIPRI, 2006). 
Thus, this severe imbalance of the trade leads to the shrinking of the Korean NDI. Domestic 
development of advanced weapons must increase if the defense economy is to improve. 
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Table 8. Variations of Arms Export Sales for the Korean NDI 
Year 1991 1995 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Export Sales ($M) 90.6 77.0 196.6 237.2 143.9 240.6 417.8 262.3 255.2 
3. Related and Supporting Industries 
The Korean NDI is composed of 88 main companies, producing the 373 kinds of 
defense materiel. And 20 to 100 subcontractors work with these main contractors. There are 
also some defense-related organizations and civil-related industries that interconnect to develop 
and produce the defense materiel. The Korean NDI is classified into two structures with 
vertically and horizontally specialized relations. The pyramidal configuration of the Korean NDI 
is constructed with the vertical relations among main contractors, subcontractors, and 
components suppliers, and the horizontal relations among weapon industries producing 
particular weapons such as fire power, automobiles, aeronautics, warship, and missile systems, 
etc. 
Figure 5 shows the pyramidal configurations of related and supporting industries for the 
Korean NDI. Generally, the vertical and horizontal structure of pyramidal configurations is the 
best solution to optimizing the effectiveness of the NDI. That is, when the lower members (such 
as material and component suppliers) are strong and solid, raw materials and components are 
supplied quickly and inexpensively. This structure has the advantage of maximizing technology 
development through competitive activities. Furthermore, interactions and exchanges among 
weapon systems industries in the horizontal structure can foster the competition of other 
weapon systems industries; likewise, interaction with civil industries can bring out critical 
technology innovation in civil industries. 
 
 
Figure 5. Pyramidal Configuration of Related and Supporting Industries  
for the Korean NDI 
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4. Firms Strategy and Rivalry 
Most Korean defense firms lack competitiveness due to the monopolistic and 
oligopolistic systems of the Korean NDI. Most defense acquisition programs are still classified, 
and much information is still limited to the public. The firms have difficulty establishing mid- and 
long-term management plans due to this limited access to detailed information. The entry barrier 
of newcomers is very high, and most firms make few efforts to develop the advanced critical 
technologies. 
Defense revenue was only 7.8% of the defense industry’s total sales in 2005, and the 
low productivity of most firms impedes the progress of the defense industry. Firms are faced 
with excessive financial cost due to their lack of budget compared to initial investment in large-
scale R&D projects. Every year, the investment of firms decreases—by $7.6 million in 2000, 
$5.1 million in 2002, and $4.5 million in 2004. 
In this environment, the aggressive management strategy of industries isn't established 
enough. Entrepreneurs and employers don't formulate great visions and goals for their 
companies because there is almost no rivalry among existing competitors or threat of new 
entrants.  
5. Government Defense Policy 
Despite numerous attempts to improve the Korean acquisition system, the issues of 
inefficiency and noncompetitiveness within the defense industry are not yet resolved. In recent 
years, the government has tried to initiate drastic improvement in defense acquisition policy. 
The domestic R&D of advanced military materiel takes precedence over overseas acquisition. In 
addition, the government has tried to establish acquisition plans that ensure the balanced 
development of advanced military materiel, in accordance with the requirements of the Joint 
Military Strategy and within the limits of the national budget. 
The government has also discontinued the current specialization and grouping system of 
the defense companies to improve industry competitiveness. Thus, technology innovations 
among associated companies will be induced. And the technology level of defense companies 
can be raised up to the level of the developed countries.  
The government has endeavored to work in close cooperation with defense companies 
to enhance exports, and has reinforced the export administration to support them. To help 
establish vision and goals within defense companies, the government has expanded its 
disclosure of information on defense investment projects to the public.  
6. Industrial Cluster 
National competitive advantage is generally more remarkable in industrial clusters than 
in individual industries. Industrial clusters often emerge and begin to grow naturally, such as 
Silicon Valley in the US. But, in Korea, governmental policy initiated many industrial clusters, 
such as industrial parks, complexes, and high-technology parks in several areas. The 
government has established some special industrial and R&D regions by providing specialized 
infrastructures and technical centers. 
Figure 6 shows one of industrial clusters of the Korean NDI in Changwon City. Related 
and supporting industries, agencies, institutes, academia, research centers, society and 
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associations, and suppliers are interconnected to research, develop, produce, and operate the 
defense materiel. Another type of cluster, the defense R&D industrial cluster in Daejeon City 
and Chungcheong Province, is shown in Figure 7. It is a unique one in Korea in the respect that 
most institutes, agencies, and universities related with R&D—in military, government, and civil 
fields—are centralized in this region. Nevertheless, the Industrial Clusters are not yet complete, 
as they are not creating the necessary high value-added products due to the lack of the proper 
establishment of knowledge-based networks. 
 
Figure 6. Defense Industrial Cluster for the Korean NDI in Changwon City 
 
 








Chances unexpectedly appear that have little to do with specific circumstances in a 
nation. They are important because they incur discontinuities that allow shifts in the competitive 
position. In the history of modern Korean economy, chances that have been particularly 
important in influencing competitive advantage are as follows: technology innovation, oil shocks, 
world financial crises, high volatility of exchange rate, international disputes and regional wars. 
Chances play a role partly by altering the determinants in the Pentagon-Defense 8 Factors 
Model.  
Korea, like other nations, is facing significant changes in its defense outlook. Since the 
2000 Joint Declaration (Pyeongyang in North Korea, June 15), South Korea and North Korea 
have promised proactive exchanges and cooperation. However, the Cold War structure is still 
lingering, with factors of potential regional friction (such as the North Korean nuclear issue). 
Countries in Northeast Asia are engaged in constant competition to expand their influence in 
this region while continuing to make efforts to modernize and transform their military forces. 
In recent years, as a result of dramatic development in science and technology, the 
Korean defense companies have been subject to sweeping changes. There has been also a 
significant qualitative change in the nature of technology because civil technology has become 
increasingly important for weapon systems. The technological cooperation of the Korean NDI 
with civil industries is underway, and it presents the NDI with a chance to enhance its 
technological competitiveness. The oil shocks greatly reduce the defense budget in energy-
dependent nations such as Korea, and downscale the size of the worldwide defense market. 
However, the US’s Global War on Terror and the local wars in the Middle East and Asia have 
shown the sudden increase in demand. 
8. Defense Policy and Relation (Foreign Government) 
During the post-Cold War period, developed countries have gained military superiority by 
protecting their national critical technological capabilities. They have significantly increased their 
defense R&D budget to develop new technologies independently, and have reinforced their 
control over and prohibit the divulgement of critical military technologies and products to foreign 
countries. In addition, they have expanded the development of dual-use technology, a spin-on 
of civil technology and spin-off of military technology. 
Most nations control and monitor the transfer of sensitive technologies to other nations 
while improving thte export-control processes to promote and protect their domestic defense 
companies. With armaments cooperation programs to strengthen their military and industrial 
relationships, they bind other nations as their partners in strong security coalitions. In recent 
years, the restrictions of arms export and military technology transfer to competing countries are 
much more stringent.  
To cope with the international defense environment, Korea has increased military 
expenditures to develop critical technologies independently, and has participated in cooperative 
programs with foreign advanced companies to introduce and co-develop advanced technology 
and to foster its arms exports. Korean has even tried to increase its arms exports in order to 
improve demand conditions within the NDI. 
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Defense Acquisition Policy and Defense Industrial Base 
Reinforcement Strategy 
1. Enlargement of Defense Budget 
Korea’s defense budget in its GDP is still low compared to other countries. In 2006, the 
ratio of the defense budget to the GDP was just 2.6%, obviously quite low compared to other 
nations’ ratios: 3.7% of US, 3.9% of China, and 4.9% of Russia. Most nations engaged in inner- 
and outer-conflicts usually allocate an average of 5-6% of their GDP to the defense budget. The 
annual growth rate of Korea’s defense budget is expected to increase up to about 9% through 
2015, making the budget share out of GDP go up gradually to 3% in 2015 (MND, 2005). 
However, the budget share has to increase gradually up to the level of developed countries. 
In addition, R&D financial resources must be expanded in order to support the 
acquisition policy. The defense R&D budget has to increase to 10% of the defense budget to 
enhance the international competitiveness of the NDI in 2015 from just 4.7% in 2007. The dual-
use technology programs are reinforced to share effectively the limited defense R&D budget 
with the civil sectors.  
2. Reinforcement of Factor Conditions 
In planning its acquisition strategy, Korea must give the utmost priority to domestic R&D 
of Arms if it is to both enhance the critical technology capabilities of the NDI to the level of 
developed countries, and to raise the operating rate of the NDI to the level of civil industries. 
The NDI must participate more in R&D if it is to lead advanced arms development and to 
enlarge its technological capabilities. The ADD also has to be transformed into a core 
technology and system-of-systems-centric institute, and the NDI's role in developing general 
weapon systems has to be expanded. 
As mentioned previously, the number of expert research engineers within the NDI is just 
about 2,000. Furthermore, the number of Korean defense R&D manpower under the 
government side is just 4,000, which is far less than the 200,000 in the US. Due to insufficient 
expert manpower, the technical level of the NDI cannot be as good as other developed 
countries. To ensure comparative advantages over developed countries, more expert 
researchers and engineers are necessary. 
3. Innovation of Defense Technology 
In the US, revolutionary innovations in military technology traditionally come from 
subcontractors or niche firms, and these firms frequently go on to dominate the markets. These 
monumental leaps are infrequently developed by the prime firms of their time. This paradigm 
has been observed frequently in many other industries as well. 
In Korea, the ADD has taken the lead in developing innovative defense technology. But, 
it is difficult for the ADD to play a leading role anymore. The ADD has to cooperate with 
academia, institutes, research centers, and industries, and to transfer acquired technologies 
and support them steadily to innovate defense technologies. If necessary, the government has 
to change the acquisition strategy to ensure a competition-driven innovation. Also, the 
government must stimulate competitions through incentives, and designate multiple sources to 
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produce the desired technology. Probably the most important thing for improving and 
developing innovative technologies is to ensure robust funding. 
4. Establishment of Competitive Environment 
The Specialization and Affiliation System that the companies are designated to 
participate in the acquisition (R&D or purchase) programs was introduced to stimulate 
technology development and to save financial resources by preventing excessive competition. 
On account of the excessive preferential authority of designated companies, strong barriers are 
formed that block new entries and obstruct technological innovation. 
To enhance the NID’s industrial competitiveness and to induce technological innovation, 
the above system is expected to be abolished by the end of 2008. On the other hand, in order to 
promote technological development and efficiency, Korean decision-makers must prepare some 
criteria and processes to prevent excessive competition and to institutionally ensure the 
entrances of small- and medium-sized companies. 
In addition, reasonable designation and management of defense materiel and 
companies have to be established; likewise, to promote competition efficiency, appropriate 
criteria for timing, scope and items in designating the defense materiel have to be set. The 
government has to prevent inefficiency by reviewing requirements periodically, and must 
consider appropriate measures to designate and manage the defense materiel and companies 
for the competitive system. 
5. Improvement of Management Condition 
The government should cover some key expenses to help the companies reform 
themselves and actively carry out additional activities. The supporting funds to promote the 
competitiveness of the NDI have to be secured, and enough subsidies to develop critical 
technologies and construct infrastructures of the NDI have to be granted. The cost-based-
contract system of defense materiel should be improved to enhance competitiveness for exports 
by reflecting more expenses. 
The government has to establish mid- and long-term strategies to reinforce the industrial 
base through regular investigation; it must also induce the rational supply system and promote 
the efficiency of resources through continuous analysis of the defense industry's demand and 
supply status. The government also has to expand industrial stratum by fostering defense-
specialized small and medium-sized business. Small and medium-sized defense firms have to 
participate in defense R&D. In addition, the government must establish technology-innovation 
support programs for the small and medium-sized defense firms. 
6. Reinforcement of Arms Export Sales 
The establishment of an improved export marketing strategy by the NDI is restricted 
because customers are foreign governments. Thus, the government-wide networks to support 
defense exports must be strengthened. Potential and promising items have to be selected and 
developed to ensure competitive advantages over other countries, and the basis of cooperation 
among governments has to be strengthened by additional agreements. 
 Korea’s defense imports ranked the 7th to the 9th largest in the world, while Korea’s 
export market share was just 0.2% (the 20th largest) in recent years. In the period of 2001 
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through 2005, Korea’s arms exports ranked the 17th largest ($337 million), while Korea’s arms 
imports ranked the 9th largest ($2,561 million). This severe unbalance of the trade has led the 
Korean NDI to shrink. Operational support systems have to be established with trustworthy, 
importing countries, and measures have to be prepared to enhance price competitiveness—
such as financial and tax support. Active cooperation with leading countries also has to be 
pursued aggressively in order to acquire their advanced systems and technologies. 
Conclusions 
This study was conducted to investigate the international competitiveness of the Korean 
National Defense Industry. The characteristics and problems of various existing competitive 
models for other civil industries were reviewed and analyzed to develop a new optimized 
analysis model. 
The new analysis model, the Pentagon-Defense 8 Factors model, fully takes into 
account the defense characteristics that have been derived to suggest the innovative strategy 
enhancing the international competitiveness of the Korean NDI. As for the Korean NDI, this 
model is composed of 5 determinants (factor conditions, demand conditions, firms strategy and 
rivalry, related and supporting industries, and government defense policy) and 3 influencers 
(defense industrial cluster, defense policy of foreign nation and mutual relation, and chance). 
The researcher studied the international competitiveness of the Korean NDI by applying 
the P-D8F model. He then suggested a possible reinforcement strategy and defense acquisition 
policy to enhance the global competitiveness for the Korean NDI and to effectively achieve the 
desired technological advancement. 
From this study, the researcher concluded that the proposed analysis model is a useful 
and practical one for analyzing and enhancing the international competitiveness of the Korean 
NDI. 
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